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Immobility and the Brexit vote 
Neil Leea, Katy Morrisb, & Tom Kemenyc 
Abstract 
Popular explanations of the Brexit vote have centred on the division between cosmopolitan 
internationalists who voted Remain, and geographically rooted individuals who voted Leave. 
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical test of whether residential immobility – the 
concept underpinning this distinction – was an important variable in the Brexit vote. We find 
that locally rooted individuals – defined as those living in their county of birth – were 7 
percent more likely to vote Leave. However, the impact of immobility was filtered by local 
circumstances: immobility only mattered for respondents in areas experiencing relative 
economic decline or increases in migrant populations. 
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1.   Introduction  
On 23rd June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union. There have been many 
attempts to explain the Brexit vote, but popular accounts have centred on an apparent division 
between two economically and culturally distinct groups: locally-oriented, geographically-rooted 
individuals who voted to Leave, and mobile cosmopolitan internationalists who voted to Remain. This 
distinction echoes a larger academic debate about the tensions at the heart of populist politics 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016); it is also linked to a long tradition of scholarship in sociology, including 
Merton’s (1957) work on local leaders in small-town America, and Tönnies’ (1940) classical 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In the context of Brexit, David Goodhart (2016) 
offers a memorable expression of such ideas, labeling the localists as “Somewheres” and the 
cosmopolitans as “Anywheres”.  
The notion of mobility (or the lack thereof) lies at the heart of this distinction. Localist “Somewheres” 
are defined by being rooted in place, with strong attachments to the specifics of their local area and 
identities formed through local associations. By contrast, Anywheres are defined partly by their 
mobility. Such mobility, which typically occurs through attending a residential university and/or 
obtaining professional work some distance away from their place of birth, contributes to the 
development of what Goodhart (2016) describes as ‘portable “achieved identities”’ which are 
internationally- rather than locally-oriented. Beyond Brexit, mobility plays a similarly important, 
though largely implicit role in larger academic discussion of the connections between 
cosmopolitanism, localism, and the populist movements that have recently reshaped politics in the 
UK, US, and a considerable number of European countries.  
The division between mobile and immobile relates to two other common explanations for recent 
populist votes, both of which suggest that it was partly a reaction to globalisation (e.g. Becker et al., 
2017). One common argument is that populism is a response to economic decline. Processes of 
economic globalisation will have benefited certain cities and regions, with residents and new migrants 
to these cities benefiting, but other places missing out (McCann, 2016). According to this argument, 
relative economic decline of themselves or their communities may have led to a populist backlash in 
the form of the Brexit vote. Supporting this view, Antonucci et al. (2017) find that individuals who 
perceived themselves to be losers from global economic integration were more likely to vote to leave 
the EU. A second common argument is that populism is a backlash against immigration. As 
previously homogenous communities diversified, some residents responded by voting for anti-
European parties and, eventually, Brexit (Carozzi, 2016; Becker & Fetzer, 2017). Both explanations – 
relative economic decline and migration – show populism as a response to globalisation by locally 
rooted residents who were in some sense ‘left behind’ by economic or demographic change.  
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Yet despite the importance placed on mobility in discussion of the Brexit vote, research has not 
considered how residential mobility – or rather, immobility – influenced the vote. People migrate for 
many reasons, but it may have multiple effects on those who do: changing fixed mentalities, opening 
up new social networks and ‘broadening the mind’ (Oishi, 2010). In contrast, immobility may be both 
a cause and a consequence of certain norms, beliefs and ways of thinking. The experience of living in 
one place over time will also shape mentalities. These influences may be changing in the UK which, 
while more mobile than many other European countries (Bell et al., 2015), has seen long term 
declines in rates of inter-regional migration (McCann, 2016; Clarke, 2017). 
This paper uses the Brexit vote as an opportunity to derive and test hypotheses regarding these 
connections. Most generally, we consider the role that residential immobility plays in explaining 
voters’ choices in the 2016 EU Referendum. We argue that immobile voters are more likely to have 
built location-specific social and human capital, and consequently to hold a less pluralistic and more 
placebound identity. All else being equal, we therefore expect immobile individuals to be more likely 
to vote Leave. However, recognising that there can be either negative or positive selection into 
immobility, the second hypothesis tested in this paper is that the effect of immobility on voting in the 
EU Referendum depends upon the extent to which one’s local community has been buffeted by 
globalisation and/or experienced considerable immigration. We identify two ideal types of 
placebound voters, each associated with particular patterns of voting behaviour – those that choose to 
remain fixed in place because things are going well in their locale, and those that feel trapped. Those 
who select positively into immobility ought to be less likely to vote Leave than those who select 
negatively.  
To test these ideas, we use early release data from Understanding Society, the primary longitudinal 
survey of UK households. In the most recent wave of the survey, individuals were asked the same 
question that was posed in the EU Referendum: "Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union?" We use these data to investigate whether, holding 
constant other factors, respondents living in the same county in which they were born were more 
likely to support Brexit than respondents who have moved away, as well as whether the effects of 
immobility on support for Brexit depend on local change in economic performance or inward 
migration. Controlling for demographic characteristics, educational attainment, psychological values 
and cognitive ability, we find that those who were living in their county of birth in 2016 are around 7 
percent more likely to state that the United Kingdom should leave the European Union. However, we 
also find that the effect of immobility on Brexit support is modified by recent local change in terms of 
wage growth and increases in the non-white British population: immobility only matters in places 
where wages are growing slowly or recent growth in the non-white British population exceeds 2 
percentage points. 
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This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Although there is a growing body of 
research into the determinants of voting patterns in the EU Referendum (for example Becker et al., 
2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2016; Antonucci et al, 2017), no study has yet explored the relationship 
between Brexit and residential immobility, nor the links between voting, mobility and local 
circumstances. To the best of our knowledge this avenue of study is also novel in within the larger 
literature on populist voting. And while academic research has long been preoccupied with the 
‘migrant’, this is not the majority experience in developed countries: our data shows that around 55% 
of UK residents live in their county of birth. Our results indicate that immobility, and in particular the 
combination of immobility and certain types of local change created an important set of circumstances 
which help explain the EU Referendum outcome. By improving our understanding of the complex 
interplay between individual characteristics, structural conditions and electoral outcomes, we 
therefore contribute to addressing the relative neglect in the social sciences of those who are ‘rooted 
in place’.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the literature on populism, the 
cosmopolitan/localist distinction, argues that investigating mobility is a crucial part of this, and 
develops a set of hypotheses. Section three presents the data and presents descriptive statistics on our 
key variables. Next, we describe the econometric model we use to test our hypotheses, before 
presenting basic regression results. Section five extends these results to investigate how individual 
mobility and local change are related. Section six concludes. 
 
2.   Brexit, populism and immobility 
The Brexit vote is often described as an expression of populist sentiment (e.g. Wolf, 2017). We can 
thus situate Brexit in relation to movements responsible for the electoral success of Donald Trump 
and the resurgence of far-right nationalist political parties in France, the Netherlands, Hungary and 
other European countries, as well as linking it to older populist manifestations. We can equally 
consider Brexit in light of more conceptual work on the subject of populism, a topic which has 
stimulated academic interest since the rise of the Populist Party in the US during the late 19th century.  
And yet populism is a highly ambiguous umbrella. It is much a disputed term in academic circles, as 
well as a highly inclusive one that encompasses political and social movements inspired by both far-
left and –right visions of society and governance; it is also a label that is almost never self-applied. 
Surveying these debates, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012, p.8) identify a ‘minimal’ definition, under 
which society is conceptualised as being “ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic 
groups, the ‘pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” This framing can be applied to 
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movements with diverse political orientations. On the left it describes Hugo Chavez’s assertion of a 
fundamental conflict pitting Venezuela’s downtrodden against the austerity-imposing U.S. 
establishment and national elites. Meanwhile, during the Brexit debates and the 2017 French election, 
right-of-centre populists called for Britain and France to throw off the yoke of European regulation 
and ‘unaccountable Brussels bureaucrats’ as keys to re-asserting ‘lost’ national greatness.  
In a recent study, Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue that populism as expressed in Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump occupies a space orthogonal to left and right distinctions, lying instead at 
one end of a continuum whose opposing pole is cosmopolitanism, which “refers to the idea that all 
humans increasingly live and interact within a single global community, not simply within a single 
polity” (p.7). This distinction harkens back to Merton’s (1957) study of influential individuals in 
small-town America, conducted during the second world war. Merton’s cosmopolitans distinguished 
themselves from ‘locals’ by the spatial extent of perceived community and social networks; by their 
weaker commitment to their present narrow geographical location. He also found that cosmopolitans 
relied on knowledge as a key to influence, while locals valued personal contact above all. 
Merton’s observations, and the larger distinction between cosmopolitanism and localism are germane 
in unpacking Brexit and other recent populist upswells. One way to understand recent populist 
movements is to view them as a rejection of a cultural and economic order that emerged after the end 
of Fordism, the oil crisis, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods international system, as well as out of 
the countercultural revolutions of the 1960s. This regime was marked by the widespread liberalization 
of rules governing trade and finance, the rise of dominant multinational firms, a twofold increase in 
the number of global migrants, as well as the introduction of new and highly disruptive technologies. 
These and other forces created a considerably less locally-bound world, in which the nation state lost 
the privileged position it held in the era of the Bretton Woods compromise in managing the economy, 
as well as its singular role in shaping defining identity and culture (Ong, 1999; Rodrik, 2017).  
In cultural terms, populist movements assert their relevance as a response to a broken social compact 
between ‘the people’ and elites, as the latter have promulgated a vision of society marked by what 
Inglehart and Norris (2016, p. 3) call the “cultural escalator”, whereby values have become 
increasingly re-centred around a vision of an immigrant-friendly multicultural society that embraces 
progressive movements aiming to expand environmental protection and promote various forms of 
human rights (women’s; LGBTQ, etc). This suggests cleavages between generations, as well as 
regularities in terms of individuals’ orientation towards political liberalism and immigration that were 
strongly articulated during the campaign for Brexit.  
Economics represents a second key explanation for the rising demand for populist politics. In high 
wage countries, a confluence of factors generated strong distributional effects that have conferred 
relative rewards in terms of employment prospects and pay upon workers with higher levels of skill 
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and education. Put simply, the gaps between winners and losers have grown too large. The economic 
forces expanding these gaps may include shifting comparative advantage in high-wage countries and 
consequent Stolper-Samuelson-type distributive effects (Autor et al., 2014; Kemeny et al., 2015); 
skill-bias in the direction of technological change (Autor et al., 2003); an insufficient supply of 
educated workers (Goldin and Katz, 2009); slowing productivity growth (Gordon, 2012); low-skill 
immigration (c.f. Peri and Yasenov, 2016; Borjas, 2015; Nickell and Salaheen, 2015); the unequal 
effects and recovery from the Great Recession (Crescenzi et al, 2016); the public economics of 
austerity (Vasilopoulou et al, 2014); and, in certain countries at least, persistent unemployment 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1987). Populist movements have found fertile ground for arguments 
blaming globally-oriented cosmopolitan elites for their disregard for those in the national polity 
whose economic circumstances have been weakened by these trends. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the highly spatially-uneven nature of many of these distributional 
effects, contemporary populism is also ‘local’ in a specific geographical sense. In many countries, it 
pits highly-mobile cosmopolitan elites operating in networks of large, high-wage urbanised areas 
against less-well-educated workers inhabiting smaller, peripheral places. This is not to say that all 
high-skill workers have sorted into large agglomerations while lower-skill workers are uniformly 
found in smaller places; nor is it an assertion that all larger cities have done well over this period. 
Rather, it describes clear patterns of sorting of high-skill workers to high-wage, high-cost, and 
consequently high-amenity cities since 1980 (Diamond, 2016), which, in the US at least, also tend to 
offer additional rewards in the form of increased intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al, 2014), 
suggesting a growing gap between a small number of thriving urban locations and the rest of the 
economy.  
Put another way, a good number of peripheral economic locations continue to suffer what Gunnar 
Myrdal (1957) described as ‘backwash’ effects: being on the losing end of agglomeration economies, 
these places become progressively emptied of capital and skilled jobs. Individuals who remain are 
less likely to have the resources, ability or desire to move to locations offering greater opportunity. 
They are also more likely to be locally-oriented in terms of their investments in knowledge and social 
capital (Gordon, 2017). In short, in the 21st century, Merton’s locals and cosmopolitans are increasing 
(though not exclusively) found in different places. This sorting links cultural and economic factors, as 
locals and cosmopolitans are increasingly cut off from one another, reinforcing existing tendencies 
and limiting opportunities for mutual understanding. This account finds considerable anecdotal 
support, not least in the fact that support for Brexit, Trump, Marine le Pen and others tends to be 
strongest in less-successful and/or smaller cities, and especially in non-urban areas.  
The migration flows described above have important implications for economic geography, but 
should not be overstated. Compared to the United States, inter-regional migration flows in the UK are 
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relatively small and declining (McCann, 2016; Clarke, 2017). They are also highly selective, with 
certain groups – particularly university graduates – being most likely to move, and are often 
associated with other factors such as risk-taking behaviour. In the UK, declining inter-regional 
migration has been the response to several trends including reduced employment rate differentials 
(Clarke, 2017). But migration is a cultural act, which is only partly determined by economic 
considerations: family and friends form a sort of location-specific human capital (Green, 2017; 
Gordon, 2017). 
In his popular book on the Brexit vote, David Goodhart’s (2016) memorably, if controversially, 
captures these cleavages, distinguishing between ‘Anywheres’ and ‘Somewheres’. Goodhart’s 
‘Anywheres’ are educated elites whose identities are not strictly tied to any particular local 
community, or even Britain, and this group is seen to have dominated politics and culture for decades. 
These elites are said to have overwhelmingly voted to remain in the European Union. Meanwhile, 
‘Somewheres’ – with strongly place-bound identities and associations – voted to leave the European 
Union, responding to both their local experience of recent uneven economic development and 
immigration, as well as the perception that elites in London are out of touch with their values. 
A growing number of scholarly studies are using data to understand the Brexit vote, and these tend to 
be framed by the broader debates around populism that we sketch above. The most rigorous use 
individual-level data to identify the relationship between voting patterns and individual demographic 
and psychographic features. Results thus far support the full range of populist narratives, though 
specific emphases differ. For instance, using pre-referendum British Election Survey (BES) data that 
recorded individuals’ voting intention, Hobolt (2016) finds evidence consistent with both cultural and 
economic themes. Older, less-educated, and lower-income respondents were more likely to intend to 
vote for Brexit, as were those who expressed more concern about immigration and multiculturalism. 
Using the same dataset, Antonucci et al., (2017) find a nonlinear relationship between voting Leave 
and both education and income, with voters with moderate levels of income and education being more 
likely to vote for Brexit than those with very low or higher levels. Also using BES, Colantone and 
Stanig (2016) find a robust positive relationship between regional vulnerability to import competition 
and the intention to vote for Brexit, a finding that fits with recent evidence linking populism to trade 
exposure in the United States (Autor et al, 2016). One might go some way towards reconciling these 
two papers’ findings with reference to work on job polarisation that confirms this ‘hollowing out’ 
effect in various economies (Goos et al. 2009).  
A range of studies examine the role played by international migration in the EU referendum. 
Colantone and Stanig (2016) conclude that stocks and flows of immigrants in NUTS 3 regions are 
unrelated to voting intention, a finding that stands in direct contrast to that found by Goodwin and 
Milazzo (2017), who use more disaggregated parliamentary constituencies. Using the Essex 
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Continuous Monitoring Survey, Clarke et al (2017) show that individual perceptions played an 
important role in shaping voting patterns. Specifically, individuals’ perceptual tradeoffs between 
immigration and terrorism, and between the economy and global influence were important in shaping 
voting patterns, as were assessments of individual political leaders in the Leave and Remain 
campaigns. Using data from the European Social Survey, Gordon (2017) also uncovers an important 
role for individual attitudes, in particular those towards immigrants, as well as one’s educational and 
occupational background. 
Empirical work on Brexit remains at an early stage, and many important questions remain 
unanswered. The focus of this paper is on one such unanswered question. To our knowledge, studies 
of Brexit and of populism more generally have not yet sought to understand how mobility – or the 
lack thereof – may play a role in shaping populist politics. This is true despite the fact that differences 
between mobile and immobile populations lie at the centre of theories of social division, linking both 
economic and cultural drivers of populism; these differences loom especially large in the formulation 
of the cosmopolitan-localist dichotomy. Indeed, cosmopolitans can only be cosmopolitan because 
they have reached beyond their local circumstances. In the internet age (and even before), a 
cosmopolitan identity might in principle be constructed through purely sedentary means, in practice 
there is every reason to think that, for many, actual residential mobility is involved, and that it 
strengthens this orientation. 
It is easy to think of reasons why the experience of moving might shift political views towards a more 
cosmopolitan perspective: loosely, it facilitates exposure to new ideas and peoples, puts previous 
experiences in their wider context, and breaks up familiar references points. Mobility ought to 
independently influence Brexit support for a few reasons. While individuals who are immobile are 
more likely to have highly localised social networks, the networks of movers span more than one 
location (Oishi, 2010). As a consequence, we expect that stayers will have more strongly place-based 
identities. Movers are also more likely to travel back and forth between these locations, in the process 
passing through other places that provide a relative wider sense of the country as a whole. And 
through these networks and interactions across locations, movers are more likely to have had 
more encounters with different types of people (Gordon, 2017). Such experiences increase the 
likelihood of being exposed to different ideas. In some ways, the rationale for a mobility effect reflect 
a particular articulation of the idiom, ‘travel broadens the mind,’ in which by ‘travel’ we mean having 
lived in more than one location. 
Though this suggests that residential immobility will be correlated with a vote to Leave, it is 
nonetheless hard to develop a causal story from mobility to voting, as mobility is both a cause and a 
consequence of a host of individual characteristics and political views. Ambition, a tolerance for risk, 
open-mindedness and other individual features both cause people to move from place to place, but 
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may also be reinforced by the act of moving (Jokela, 2009; Zimmerman and Neyer, 2013). Moreover, 
since Greenwood (1997) identifies higher education participation and obtaining employment as two of 
the most important drivers of internal migration in developed economies, it is plausible that mobility 
may both enable an improvement in human capital, and simultaneously afford entry into social 
networks and economic opportunities that mean individuals are better positioned to succeed in the 
global economy. This presents a major confounding problem in identifying the causal effects of 
(im)mobility, one which we can only address partially by including a wide range of potential 
confounders as covariates.  
Mobility or internal migration is driven by a complex mix of individual features and locational 
differences (ibid), with residential movers in the UK changing locations for diverse reasons at a range 
of different points in their life-cycle (ONS, 2016). On the other hand, we conjecture two ideal types of 
immobile people: those that select into immobility because the contemporary lived social and 
economic features in the counties in which they are born are not dissatisfying; and those that are 
‘stuck’ in circumstances that are not satisfying but for whatever reason they are unable or unwilling to 
move to resolve them. Though locational satisfaction is likely to be driven by individual, idiosyncratic 
preferences, the review above suggests that locally specific experiences of globalisation and 
community are likely to act as conditioning forces. This bifurcation suggests the following 
hypothesis: the effect of immobility on support for Brexit will depend on the local extent of local 
economic or demographic change.  
 
3. Data   
Data is drawn from Understanding Society (also known as the UK Household Longitudinal Study), a 
household panel survey that has followed individuals from approximately 40,000 households in the 
United Kingdom since 2009. Where possible, all adult (age 16 or above) members of Understanding 
Society households are interviewed each year; original sample members are followed if they leave 
their original household and new (or newly eligible) members of Understanding Society households 
are also added to the survey. Since Wave 2 (2010), Understanding Society has incorporated 
continuing participants of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a similar household panel 
survey of around 8,000 households in the UK which began in 1991 and ran for 18 successive years. In 
Wave 8, Understanding Society respondents were asked the same question that was posed in the UK 
referendum on EU membership that took place on 23rd June 2016: ‘Should the United Kingdom 
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remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ The answer to this question 
is our dependent variable.1  
Owing to the central focus on immobility and Brexit voting preferences, the main independent 
variable employed in this analysis is whether a respondent was living in the same county in which 
they were born at the most recent interview. We set out more on how we construct this variable in 
Appendix A. The binary variable was generated by comparing the county in which respondents were 
born with the county in which they were living in at Wave 8 or, where data was missing, at Wave 7. 
Our main variable of interest, immobile, is 1 where a respondent is living in the county they were born 
in and 0 when not2. A small majority (55%) of our sample live in their county of birth. As we report 
below, we additionally consider several alternative measures of immobility. 
Insert table 1 around here 
The bivariate relationship between Brexit support and immobility is given in table 1. For simplicity, 
we restrict the table to the smallest sample used in our results (that used in table 4), although this 
affects the results little, and use weights so the results are representative of the UK population. The 
results show a slight over-statement of support for Remain: 53 percent state they will vote Remain, 
compared to 48 percent in the actual EU Referendum. They also show a significant difference in 
Brexit support between the immobile and the mobile. More than half (51 percent) of the immobile 
intended to vote to leave the European Union, compared to just 41 percent of the mobile.  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.1  Model and methodology 
Our data is a cross-section, where the dependent variable takes the form of the question posed in the 
EU referendum. To separate out the impact of immobility from other potentially confounding factors, 
we begin by estimating a simple probit regression model. This is estimated for each individual ‘i’ and 
takes the following form:  
 
 EU Refi = ɑ + β1 Immobilei + β'2 Personi + β'3 Placei + β4 Immobility*Placei + ε  
                                                
1 We exclude missing responses. Note that our data is the early-access version of the Understanding Society, made available 
by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex ahead of the scheduled full release of Wave 8 
data in November 2018. 
2 It is not possible to identify the age at which those who are not living in the same county in which they were born moved 
from the Understanding Society data. The 0 (mover) category thus includes respondents who moved as children and 
respondents who moved as adults, the common denominator being they have lived in more than one county and been 
exposed to more than one local context since birth, in contrast to immobile respondents.  
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Where, “Immobile” is an indicator for whether the individual lives in their county of birth. “Person” is 
a vector of individual characteristics such as age, age2, education, gender, ethnicity, personality and 
political engagement. “Place” is a vector of local characteristics, of which the two most important are 
indicators of economic and cultural change. Most importantly here, “Immobility*Place” is the linear 
interaction term between individual mobility and our two measures of local change drawn from UK 
Nomis. 
Control variables 
To motivate our control variables, we draw on the literature on the determinants of populist voting 
(see Inglehart and Norris, 2016, or Antonnuci et al., 2017). First, we include a set of variables for the 
basic demographic characteristics of individuals. Males were generally seen as more likely to vote to 
leave, so we include a control for gender. Age was also significant, with older voters generally being 
more likely to vote Leave up to a certain point, beyond which older voters were more likely to vote 
Remain. We control both for age and, owing to the differential effect with increasing age, also use a 
quadratic term. We also include an ethnicity variable to reflect the fact that whites have tended to be 
more Eurosceptic than members of ethnic minorities. Data on income in the early release data have a 
large number of missing observations, so instead we include controls for both income satisfaction and 
life satisfaction. 
Educational attainment is seen as a critical determinant of populist views, with those holding lower 
educational qualifications being more likely to be pro-Brexit. In the present context, education is 
doubly crucial, since those with higher qualifications are also more likely to be mobile, owing in part 
to the residential model of higher education in the United Kingdom. We therefore include controls for 
four major educational categories: below GCSE level; GCSE or equivalent; A-Level or equivalent; 
and undergraduate degree or higher. To account for the fact that Understanding Society Wave 8 
fieldwork spanned the EU referendum vote and that public knowledge of the outcome may have 
altered responses to the EU membership question posed in Wave 8, we incorporate a binary variable 
which denotes whether the respondent was interviewed before or after 23rd June 2016. Summary 
statistics and definitions for these variables are included in table 2.  
Insert table 2 around here 
4.2  Basic results 
Table 3 summarises the results of our basic regression model. This shows that people living in their 
county of birth are more likely to be pro-Brexit and that this relationship holds when we control for 
basic personal characteristics (age, ethnicity) and broader personal characteristics (education, labour 
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force status and both income and life satisfaction). Figure 1 considers the average marginal effects. 
This shows that, on average, the immobile were 10 percent more likely to have pro-Brexit beliefs, 
after controlling for basic individual characteristics. While this is not the most important variable in 
our model (the average marginal effect for having a degree is a 20% increase in probabilities), it is 
relatively robust across specifications and consistently statistically significant.  
Insert table 3 around here 
Insert figure 1 around here 
Our control variables also provide some insights into the demographics of the Brexit vote. Ethnically 
white people were more likely to favour Brexit, as were older people although the effect declines. 
Most likely reflecting a combination of increasingly close polls in the run-up to the vote and sample 
response bias, those sampled before the vote were less likely to be pro-Brexit than those afterwards. 
In addition, those with higher income satisfaction were less likely to be pro-Brexit; those with higher 
life satisfaction more likely. Education was a strong predictor of the Brexit vote. That the immobility 
effect holds when controlling for educational attainment is particularly noteworthy given the 
established association between higher educational attainment and mobility in the United Kingdom 
(Green, 2017). The implication of table 3 is that among respondents with the same levels of 
educational attainment (for example those with no or low qualifications), those who were living in 
their county of birth were more likely to be pro-Brexit than those who have moved at some point in 
their life. In other words, immobility appears to shape voting preferences over and above the effect of 
educational attainment.  
4.3  Testing other explanations: Psychology, values, social networks and mobility 
There are several obvious channels through which immobility might be associated with populist 
voting. Other literature has suggested that factors such as individual values or personal psychology 
may influence voting intentions (see Kaufman, 2016, for example). These will be highly inter-related 
with mobility with causality running both ways. For example, more psychologically open individuals 
might be more likely to move; but movement will make individuals more psychologically open. In 
table 4 we incorporate a series of potentially confounding variables into our model, taken from earlier 
waves of Understanding Society, to test whether these affect the impact of immobility on pro-Brexit 
beliefs. While we cannot be perfectly confident in arguing that results indicate an independent causal 
role for immobility in shaping the Brexit vote, controlling for these factors helps isolate the distinct 
effect of mobility, independent of its impact on these.3  
                                                
3 We do attempt to show a causal effect using an instrumental variable (IV) approach based on birth 
order, following the intuition that first born children are likely to move further from home. 
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Insert table 4 around here 
A first concern is that there may be some unobserved factor related to cognitive ability which survives 
even once we include educational controls (for example, some significant difference between GCSE 
grades or the quality of degree level qualifications). We address this by introducing two indicators for 
cognitive testing taken from an earlier wave of the data: one of which controls for numeric ability and 
another for verbal recollection. These are a scale where a higher positive value indicates a higher 
number of correct answers in a cognitive test (note the two variables have different scales). These are 
introduced in model 1, but including these variables does not seem to influence the basic result, and 
our variable for immobility remains statistically significant with a similar coefficient.  
Psychological factors are a second potential explanation. These have been seen as important in 
explaining populist votes such as Brexit (Obschonka et al., 2017; Garretsen et al., 2017). Moreover, 
migration decisions are partly explained by individual psychology (Rentfrow et al., 2008). To account 
for this, we use indicators of the established “Big Five” indicators of personality traits (see Barrick 
and Mount, 1991). These are: Conscientiousness – associated with hard work, organisation and task 
completion; Extraversion – being outgoing, sociable and assertive; Openness – capturing originality, 
creativity and open to new ideas; Agreeableness – which captures kindness and trust, and; 
Neuroticism – if the individual is worried and tense.  Each of these is a scale between 1 – 7, with a set 
of sub-questions are used to establish an overall indicator. These are introduced in model 2. They 
show that psychological factors did matter for Brexit beliefs - Conscientiousness and Extraversion are 
positively related to being pro-Brexit, while Openness and Agreeableness are negatively so. These 
individual level findings are very similar to the local authority level study of Garretsen et al. (2017). 
However, our coefficient for immobility changes little even once we control for psychology. 
Finally, the argument has been made repeatedly that values mattered in the Brexit vote. For example, 
Kaufmann (2016) argues that differences in values were the main dividing line between remain and 
leave voters. To rule this out, model 3 includes four indicators which reflect individual values or 
belief. These are the extent to which people believe four statements related to gender differences in 
the home, their power to influence government, scepticism about climate change and the intentions of 
public officials. While they show clear evidence that values matter, with all four beliefs positively and 
statistically significantly related to pro-Brexit views, immobility seems to matter even with these 
controls. 
Finally, in model 4 we include variables for psychology, cognitive ability, beliefs / values together. 
The headline remains similar: regardless of controls used, the variable for immobility is positive and 
                                                
Unfortunately, while our results suggest a positive relationship between immobility and Brexit, the 
instrument is weak.  
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statistically significant. To quantify this effect, we compute the average marginal effect. This shows 
that even when controlling for many of the potential mechanisms through which living in county of 
birth might influence support for Brexit, it is still associated with a 7 percent higher probability of 
voting for Brexit. 
 
5.   Local circumstances, mobility and Brexit 
Our second research question is the extent to which local change – either in terms of increased 
migration or relative economic decline – was felt differently by the immobile and shaped their voting 
preferences. As Gordon (2017) argues, recent populist votes can be understood partly as geographical 
phenomenon, in two senses. Firstly, because of concentrations of individuals in certain places which 
have led to the ‘map’ of populist votes. But secondly, because certain areas have experienced change 
and this may have presented certain groups with a loss of ability to control their local environment. 
Two explanations – the cultural view of populist votes as a response to changing communities, and 
the economic view of populism as a threat to the economic positions of many in declining areas – are 
linked at a local level. The immobile are, by definition, more tied to their local area and thus more 
exposed to external change, so local change may have influenced them more than other groups, with 
the Brexit vote being a way of protesting against changes to their local environment.  
 
To test these ideas, in table 5 we interact the immobility variable with two indicators of recent local 
change drawn from UK Nomis: percentage growth in average gross weekly wages between 2008 and 
2015 and percentage point change in the share of non-white British people in the local area, 2005 - 
2015. We adapt the model used in table 4, column 5 slightly. Because subsequent change is likely to 
be affected by initial levels, we now include variables for either the average wage of the county of 
residence or the initial proportion of non-white British residents. We also exclude the regional 
dummies, as these are highly collinear with the other local indicators, and residents of Northern 
Ireland are excluded as no sub-national data is available there.   
 
Insert table 5 around here 
 
Models 1 and 2 show the results for changing pay levels; models 3 and 4 for changing demographics. 
We do not include both sets of variables together because of collinearity. We note that, perhaps 
surprisingly, places with a higher average income tended to see people vote for Brexit, although the 
effect is small and note that we control for individual satisfaction with their own income. More to the 
point, change in pay also matters, with percentage change in gross weekly full time pay between 2008 
and 2015 negatively related to the Brexit vote. People in places experiencing relative economic 
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decline were more likely to vote for Brexit and vice versa. Model 2 shows an important caveat to this 
result: local pay change only matters amongst those who are immobile. We develop this line of 
analysis in figure 2, which graphically presents the impact of immobility on probability of being pro-
Brexit at different levels of local pay. The central line gives the predicted marginal effect, with the 
shaded area illustrating the 95% confidence intervals. This shows that the effect of immobility on pro-
Brexit views is higher when local pay increases have been lower. But where the local economy has 
been performing better the impact of immobility declines and below a certain point is not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
Insert figure 2 around here 
 
Models 3 and 4 consider changes in demographic composition. Our indicator here - the proportion 
who do not consider themselves white British - is intended to capture both inward migration and 
ethnic change. We note first of all that the proportion who are not white British in a local area is 
unrelated to support for Brexit. Change in the share of the population who are not white-British may 
matter, but the effect is only statistically significant at the 1% level. However, once this is interacted 
with immobility the effect becomes clearer. As with the results for changes in local wages, it is the 
combination of both immobility and either economic or demographic change which seems to matter. 
We illustrate this graphically in figure 3. This shows an almost opposite effect than for wages: the 
effect of immobility on Brexit increases as local non-white British share increase. The differences 
between voting patterns of the mobile and immobile are, in contrast, negligible where there has been 
little local change. 
 
Insert figure 3 around here 
 
 
Sensitivity Checks 
 
One concern with our results is that our indicator of immobility may not fully capture the concept we 
are trying to capture. As discussed above, we define immobile respondents as those who were living 
in the same county in which they were born in 2016; and mobile respondents as those who were not. 
This indicator has a number of merits, as it is directly about the individual’s experience and can be 
consistently applied across time. There are two potential limitations to this definition. First, we cannot 
conclusively establish from the data that immobile respondents have always lived in their county of 
birth. However, we can check whether immobile respondents have ever lived elsewhere during the 
period in which they have participated in Understanding Society, or its predecessor, the British 
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Household Panel Survey. To test if this influences our results, we generate a dummy variable which 
identifies immobile respondents who left and then returned. Table 6 gives the results of models using 
this variable, both without (model 1) and with (model 2) our core indicator of immobility. It makes 
little difference to the results, suggesting that our main results are driven by longer-term processes of 
immobility rather than short-term moves.  
 
As a further robustness test, we also identify alternative measures of immobility in our data. The first 
is derived from a question which asks each individual about the location of up to 3 best friends. Our 
variable is 1 if all named best friends live within 5 miles of the respondent, and 0 otherwise. We 
assume that someone immobile will have made friends locally and their friends will also be less likely 
to move away. A second, related variable is the distance from the respondent’s mother: this is 1 if the 
respondents mother lives within 15 minutes journey time, and 0 otherwise. This is only available for a 
smaller group of respondents and those whose mother is still alive. But we assume that locally rooted 
people live close to their parents, and so this variable should be a good alternative indicator (although 
it cannot account for maternal moves). We include these in models 3, 4 and 5. These models show 
some relationship when included on their own and are both positively related, with the maternal 
distance being positive. Yet when included alongside our county of birth indicator neither is 
statistically significant. We take this as evidence that immobility does matter, even if defined in other 
ways, but also that we have identified the best variable to capture it.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The UK electorate voted to leave the European Union on 23rd June 2016. This vote was one of a 
series of populist votes which have been seen as a reaction to the divergent fortunes of people and 
places under processes of globalisation. Implicit within this ‘divergent fortunes’ narrative is a division 
between mobile and the immobile citizens: mobility has long been seen as important by sociologists, 
political scientists and geographers but no research has hitherto explored whether residential 
immobility was an important variable in the Brexit vote. This paper first addresses this gap using 
early access data from Understanding Society and then explores whether the effects of immobility on 
support for Brexit are contingent on local change in economic performance or inward migration.  
Our results show a consistent effect: immobile people – proxied as those living in their country of 
birth – are around 7% more likely to be in favour of Brexit, even when controlling for individual 
factors and cultural or psychological factors which might be associated with immobility. However, 
our results are only partly about immobility per se. Instead, our analysis suggests that the effect of 
immobility on individual support for Brexit is filtered by local circumstances: immobility only 
matters for respondents living in places experiencing relative economic decline or those where there 
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have been substantial recent increases in non-white British migration. It is thus the combination of 
immobile people and the characteristics of the places that they have remained immobile in that appear 
to shape support for Brexit. Had more of the British electorate moved away from the place they were 
born in; had the places in which the immobile have stayed in fared better economically under 
processes of globalisation; or had these places remained more stable in terms of demographic 
composition, then the EU Referendum outcome may have been different.  
The policy implications of our results are comparatively nuanced. The obvious implication of our 
work is that declining rates of geographical mobility may have helped explain the Brexit vote. It is 
clear that many groups in the UK are currently unable to move, as they are “shut out” of some of the 
most important areas of opportunity by high house prices (Luce 2017:14). Given widening 
geographical divergence in the UK (McCann, 2016), facilitating access to growing cities and regions 
for those who want to move is one potential policy implication. Yet spatial mobility cannot be the 
whole solution: many people do not want to move, and an economic development policy which relies 
solely on spatial mobility into advantaged areas ignores the benefits of stable community, people’s 
social networks and attachment to place. Indeed, our second finding – that people living in areas 
experiencing relative economic decline or demographic change – were more likely to vote for Brexit, 
hints at the need to spread opportunity more widely across the UK. There are a number of suggested 
ways of doing this. For example, Iammarino et al (2017) argue for the use of place-sensitive 
development policies, while Martin et al. (2016) argue for radical decentralisation of power. All told, 
in addition to supporting individuals in moving to areas of opportunity, we need to ensure the 
opportunities are spread more widely. 
 
It is important also to caveat our results: immobility was just one factor in the vote, others, such as 
educational attainment, were more important, and we are unable to fully tease out the complex 
linkages between mobility, individual psychology and values and populist voting. But we believe our 
work highlights two fruitful areas of future research. Firstly, while we have begun to investigate the 
relationships between mobility, values and populism, more work in this area would help better 
understand recent reactions to globalisation. Secondly, we argue for a renewed focus on those who are 
immobile. The literature on economic geography has (including the authors’ own work), perhaps been 
skewed to study of those who are mobile. This ignores the majority of the population and their 
circumstances. The current backlash against globalisation, in the form of Brexit and the Trump vote, 
justifies an even greater focus on the local.   
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Figure 1. Average marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of impact of living in county 
of birth on Brexit beliefs 
 
Note: Each model presents the average marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as living 
in county of birth) on belief that Britain should leave the European Union. Models specified as in 
table 3, with controls for Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, 
labour force status (employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, 
income satisfaction and Government Office Region. 
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Figure 2. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of economic change, 
predictive marginal effect 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as 
living in county of birth) at different levels of local changes in wages on belief that Britain should 
leave the European Union. 95% Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models specified as in 
table 5, with controls for Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, 
labour force status (employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, 
income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality traits and values. 
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Figure 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit beliefs at different levels of demographic change, 
predictive marginal effect 
 
Note: Each model presents the predicted marginal effect of the impact of immobility (defined as 
living in county of birth) at different levels of local changes in non-White population on belief that 
Britain should leave the European Union. 95% Confidence intervals given by shaded area. Models 
specified as in table 5, with controls for Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled 
before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), education, life 
satisfaction, income satisfaction, cognitive testing, the Big 5 personality traits and values. 
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Table 1. Brexit support (%) by mobility 
 Mobility:   
Should the United Kingdom 
remain a member of the 
European Union? 
Mobile (lives outside 
county of birth) 
Immobile (lives in 
county of birth) 
Total 
Yes 60.0 48.8 53.6 
No 40.0 51.2 46.4 
Note: N = 6,221. Weights applied. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK should leave the 
European Union 
Answers yes to: “Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union?  0.46   0.50  0 1 
Lives in county of birth Lives in county in which they were born  0.56   0.50  0 1 
Local best friend 
All named best friends live less than 5 
miles away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Local mother Mother lives < 30 minutes away  0.28   0.45  0 1 
Stayer-returner 
Has lived outside county in lifetime of 
survey, but now in county of birth  0.04   0.20  0 1 
Verbal ability 
Verbal fluency: Count of correct answers 
(from 49)   23.15   6.32  0 49 
Numeric ability 
Numeric ability: Count of items 
answered correctly (from 5)  3.77   1.04  0 5 
Agreeableness  Big 5 Personality trait: Agreeableness  5.60   1.02  1 7 
Conscientiousness 
Big 5 Personality trait: 
Conscientiousness  5.45   1.08  1 7 
Extraversion  Big 5 Personality trait: Extraversion  4.61   1.28  1 7 
Neuroticism Big 5 Personality trait: Neuroticism  3.60   1.41  1 7 
Openness Big 5 Personality trait: Openness  4.63   1.27  1 7 
Traditional 
Believes the husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home  0.38   0.48  0 1 
Government 
don't have a say in what government 
does  1.20   0.86  0 2 
Environmental scepticism 
environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated  1.03   0.79  0 2 
officials public officials don't care  1.27   0.80  0 2 
Male Male gender  0.48   0.50  0 1 
White White ethnicity 0.96 0.19 0 1 
Mixed Mixed ethnicity  0.01   0.09  0 1 
Asian Asian ethnicity  0.02   0.13  0 1 
Black Black ethnicity  0.00   0.07  0 1 
Other “Other” ethnicity  0.00   0.04  0 1 
Age Age   50.25   17.27  20 100 
Age Squared Age squared  2,821   1,808  400 10000 
Sampled before 
referendum 
Sampling occurred before the 
referendum vote (23rd June 2016)  0.42   0.49  0 1 
Employed  Employed at time of 2016 interview 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Unemployed Unemployed at time of 2016 interview  0.03   0.17  0 1 
Inactive Inactive at time of 2016 interview  0.06   0.24  0 1 
Retired Retired at time of 2016 interview  0.26   0.44  0 1 
Student Student at time of 2016 interview  0.01   0.12  0 1 
No qualifications Highest qualification: No qualification 0.27 0.44   
GCSE  
Highest qualification: GCSE or 
equivalent  0.27   0.44  0 1 
A Level Highest qualification: A-level  0.11   0.32  0 1 
Degree 
Highest qualification: Degree or 
equivalent  0.37   0.48  0 1 
Income satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with income  4.92   1.57  1 7 
Life satisfaction Self-reported satisfaction with life  5.27   1.41  1 7 
Note: 6,221 Observations. Source for all reported variables is Understanding Society, various waves. 
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Table 3. Impact of immobility on Brexit support, probit regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union 
Lives in county of birth 0.279*** 0.236*** 0.324*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0387) (0.0536) 
Sample Full Full Only those who 
voted in 2016 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 3,457 
Note: Estimated as probit regression results with robust standard errors. Weights applied. 
Controls used in columns 2 and 3: Gender, 5 Ethnic Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled 
before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, student, unemployed, inactive), 
education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and Government Office Region. Note that 
regression coefficients without restricting sample to those used in all regressions are very 
similar: for column 1, beta=0.231026, (n = 10,014), for column 3, beta = 0.2284 (n = 7,290) 
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Table 4. Immobility and Brexit support – alternative explanations, 2016 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Area Variable 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
           
Immobility Lives in county of birth 0.244*** 0.260*** 0.216*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0411) (0.0417) 
Cognitive test Verbal ability -0.00830**   -0.00437 
  (0.00324)   (0.00333) 
 Numeric ability -0.0928***   -0.0701*** 
  (0.0220)   (0.0228) 
Psychology Agreeableness  -0.0823***  -0.0679*** 
   (0.0205)  (0.0210) 
 Conscientiousness  0.0521***  0.0437** 
   (0.0199)  (0.0205) 
 Extraversion  0.0329**  0.0222 
   (0.0155)  (0.0158) 
 Neuroticism  -0.0126  -0.0123 
   (0.0147)  (0.0152) 
 Openness  -0.0837***  -0.0573*** 
   (0.0159)  (0.0165) 
Values / beliefs Husband should earn, wife 
should stay at home   0.164*** 0.152*** 
    (0.0405) (0.0407) 
 Don't have a say in what 
government does   0.140*** 0.127*** 
    (0.0282) (0.0286) 
 Environmental crisis has been 
exaggerated   0.264*** 0.251*** 
    (0.0252) (0.0254) 
 Public officials don't care   0.144*** 0.137*** 
    (0.0304) (0.0305) 
 Constant -0.299 -0.0829 -1.625*** -0.952*** 
  (0.244) (0.286) (0.245) (0.312) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 6,221 
 Pseudo R2 0.0881 0.0912 0.123 0.130 
Estimated as a probit regression with robust standard errors. Unreported controls are for 
gender, age, age2, ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, education, labour force status 
and region. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effect for “Lives in county of 
birth” is 0.07 in column 4. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. Probit regressions between local change interacted with mobility and Brexit 
support 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union  
 
          
Log local gross weekly full time pay, 2015 0.315*** 0.320***   
 (0.0661) (0.0660)   
Immobile: Lives in county of birth 0.199*** 0.387*** 0.175*** 0.0514 
 (0.0415) (0.0939) (0.0411) (0.0713) 
Percent Δ in gross weekly full time pay, 2008 – 2015 
-
0.00951** -0.00281   
 (0.00373) (0.00475)   
Immobile * Percent Δ in local gross weekly full time pay, 
2008 - 2015  -0.0137**   
  (0.00596)   
Percent Not White British   -0.000399 -0.000496 
   (0.00321) (0.00323) 
Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 2015   0.0194* 0.00557 
   (0.0111) (0.0130) 
Immobile * Percentage Point Δ Not White-British, 2005 - 
2015    0.0237** 
    (0.0120) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 
Estimated as probit regressions with robust standard errors. Excludes Northern Ireland. 
Unreported controls are for gender, age, age2, ethnicity, if interviewed before Referendum, 
education and labour force status.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Sensitivity tests: Alternative indicators of immobility, probit regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Believes UK should leave the European Union 
 
Stayer-returner 0.00592 -0.0285    
 (0.0418) (0.0418)    
Best friend < 5 miles away   0.0340*  0.0405 
   (0.0174)  (0.0254) 
Mother < 15 minutes away     0.0680*** 0.0350 
    (0.0229) (0.0240) 
Lives in county of birth  0.0840***   0.106*** 
  (0.0166)   (0.0239) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,221 6,221 6,221 2,945 2,945 
Note: Average marginal effects presented. Estimated as probit regression results with robust 
standard errors. Weights applied. Controls used in columns 2 and 3: Gender, 5 Ethnic 
Categories, Age, Age2, whether sampled before Brexit, labour force status (employed, retired, 
student, unemployed, inactive), education, life satisfaction, income satisfaction and 
Government Office Region.  
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Appendix A: Variable construction 
The main independent variable employed in the analysis presented here describes whether a 
respondent was living in the same county in which they were born at the most recent interview. 
Deriving this binary stayer variable naturally relies on identifying where Understanding Society 
respondents were born, where they were living most recently and whether these two locations are the 
same or different.  
 
Data on the county of birth of Understanding Society respondents is drawn from two different 
sources, reflecting the incorporation of British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) into Understanding 
Society from 2010 onwards and the use of different geographies and coding systems for recording the 
county of birth of old BHPS sample members and new Understanding Society sample members.  
 
For BHPS respondents county of birth is reported in plbornd - district of birth4. The coding 
framework for plbornd includes some very antiquated geographies (for example Middlesex in 
England; Ogwr in Wales; Cunninghame in Scotland) which are matched to the contemporary 
boundaries of counties or unitary authorities via a look-up table created specifically for this analysis, 
which draws on Wikipedia and other sources of information about historic local government 
boundary changes.   
 
For Understanding Society respondents, county of birth is reported in plbornc – county of birth. The 
coding framework for plbornc is entirely different to the coding framework for the BHPS plbornd 
variable but it too includes antiquated geographies (for example Avon in England; Cardiganshire in 
Wales; Kirkcudbrightshire in Scotland). The places of birth as reported by Understanding Society 
respondents are matched to contemporary local government boundaries via a separate look-up table 
created for this analysis, which again draws on Wikipedia and other sources of information about 
local government boundary change following a similar protocol to the BHPS matching process. In 
general, plbornc geographies in Understanding Society data are greater in scale than BHPS plbornd 
geographies so BHPS geographies are aggregated up to the lowest common denominator offered by 
the Understanding Society coding framework.  
 
Respondents’ current place of residence is identified by locating individuals in households and 
households in contemporary local authority area (pre-2015 local government boundaries) using 
Understanding Society SN 6666 geocodes. Geocodes are provided for local authority districts / 
unitary authorities. Since local authority districts represent a lower tier of governance than local 
authority counties, data on local authority district of residence in Wave 8 (or Wave 7, where such data 
are missing) are aggregated up to local authority county of residence via publically available look-up 
tables.  
 
Generating the stayer variable involves comparing whether respondents are still living in the same 
county in which they were born. This is not as straightforward as it may sound, for a number of 
reasons. For example, from the documentation available it is not possible to ascertain whether 
respondents identified the exact place in which they were born (most commonly, a place containing a 
large hospital with a maternity ward) or whether they tended to name the place in which their parents 
were living at the time of their birth. It is also impossible to determine exactly what geography 
respondents who said they were born in historic counties such as Lincolnshire were referring to, since 
the old county of Lincolnshire has been split into three contemporary unitary authorities: 
Lincolnshire; North Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire.  
 
To mitigate the impact of such geographical quirks, we take a comparatively ‘generous’ approach to 
geographical matching. To illustrate, a respondent who was born in Lincolnshire is coded as a stayer 
if they were living in either Lincolnshire; North Lincolnshire or North East Lincolnshire unitary 
                                                
4 BHPS respondents who agreed to continue participating in Understanding Society, the successor to the BHPS, have not 
been re-interviewed about where they were born.  
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authorities in the last wave of Understanding Society. They are coded as a leaver if they now live in 
any other unitary authority in the United Kingdom.  
 
